Introduction
Scholarly attention to pharmaceutical companies' ability to sustain research and development (R&D) productivity has increased as they increasingly handle challenges such as escalating R&D expenditure, a lack of new molecule entities (NMEs), and cost containment schemes by payors (1, 2) . Indeed, R&D expenditure in the pharmaceutical industry has increased rapidly (3, 4) , but the number of NMEs entering the market has declined (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) . Some argue that the rising cost was due to the complex nature of clinical trials while development risk remained fairly stable from the 1970s to 1990s (12) (13) (14) .
Among Japan, Europe, and the United States, R&D spending declined most in Japan. Japanese companies spent 5,161 million yen in 1990 and 12,760 million yen in 2010. European companies spent 7,766 million euros in 1990 and 27,796 million euros in 2010. U.S. companies spent 6,803 million dollars in 1990 and 40,688 million dollars in 2010. Meanwhile, R&D productivity in terms of NME development declined most in Japan as well. Japanese, European, and U.S. pharmaceutical companies developed 74, 88, and 49 NMEs, respectively between 1990 and 1994, and 36, 89, and 77 NMEs between 1995 and 2000 (15) . Consequently, in an attempt to address the deterioration of R&D productivity, Japanese pharmaceutical companies started pursuing mergers and acquisitions (M&As) since 1995 (Table 1) . However, although the deterioration of R&D productivity has long been considered a major cause of M&As (16) (17) (18) , few studies have investigated quantitatively the possible causes of the deterioration and the relationship between the deterioration and M&As. This study attempts to address this gap in the literature by examining the case of the Japanese pharmaceutical industry.
In analyzing the relationship between the deterioration of R&D productivity and industry consolidation, the Japanese pharmaceutical industry is an ideal example for at least four reasons. First, the deterioration of R&D productivity in this industry accelerated after the 1990s. Second, except when Merck obtained a minority share in Banyu in 1982, the industry did not have M&As until 1997. Third, Japanese companies developed 30 globally available NMEs in the 1980s and 1990s. The main interest of their R&D programs shifted from antibiotics in the 1980s to drugs for lifestyle diseases such as high cholesterol, hypertension, and diabetes in the 1990s (Table 2) . Finally, Japan provides many official data sources. It has a universal health care coverage system, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHLW) approves and sets the price for each drug to be reimbursed by patients. The MHLW also provides ethical drug production statistics for 34 effi cacy classes and 177 subclasses (Table 3) . Finally, pharmaceutical companies must complete and submit an interview form to the MHLW, disclosing detailed information on their approved drugs such as the origin of NMEs, in order for those drugs to be listed under the MHLW's reimbursement list. Table 4 is a list of the number of NMEs approved by the MHLW. Antibiotics represented more than 10% of the total NMEs approved in the 1980s. However, this share dropped sharply in the 1990s because of the pharmaceutical companies' focal shift to lifestyle diseases. In this study, we verify the relationship between lifestyle drug franchises and the deterioration of R&D productivity. We consider antibiotics, digestive system, and various cardiovascular and metabolism franchises as lifestyle disease drugs.
Several studies have discussed the changes in R&D efficiency of Japanese pharmaceutical companies. One study showed that the Japanese domestic environment for pharmaceuticals changed radically from 1975 to 1995, which degraded the innovative capability of the companies (19) . Another study emphasized the importance of understanding the dynamics of R&D investment strategies between 1975 and 1990 (20) . Finally, one study measured and observed the deterioration of R&D productivity of Japanese pharmaceutical companies from 1983 to 1992 using a quantitative method (21) . This study aims to investigate the possible causes of the deterioration of R&D productivity in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry in the 1990s and its consequences, using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist Index (22, 23) . Based on the scores from the Malmquist Index calculation, one-way ANOVA and Tukey-Kramer testing were conducted to identify the possible causes of R&D productivity deterioration from 1980 to 1997. The relationship between the deterioration of R&D productivity and M&As was also discussed.
Materials and Methods

Three approaches to measure R&D productivity
There are at least three approaches to measure R&D productivity: ratio analysis, least squares regression, and DEA. DEA is a mathematical programming approach for measuring relative efficiency, utilizing multiple inputs and outputs, while ratio analysis handles single inputs and outputs. The fundamental difference between the statistical and DEA approaches is that the former reflects the average or central tendency behavior of the observations, while the latter deals with the best performance and evaluates all performances by deviations from the effi cient frontier. DEA offers at least two advantages as an empirical tool in measuring R&D effi ciency. First, it does not require a data normalization process, unlike in an econometric approach. Second, it is a non-parametric approach and does not require an explicit specifi cation of inputs and outputs.
Variables used in this paper
In our DEA, we select one input and three output variables to measure R&D productivity: the actual R&D expenditure as the sole input, and the accumulated number of weighted NMEs approved by the MHLW, sales, and operating profi t as the three output variables. Some studies employed a multiple-variable model with the number of patent and publication submissions as input (21) . However, the publication strategy may vary among companies, and there is little relationship between these variables and actual sales. Thus, these variables are not satisfactory indicators of input. We, Subclass code under consideration. To distinguish between internal and licensed NMEs, cost allocation among the clinical phases was considered. The average expected cost of the clinical period was 60.6 million dollars in 2000, and the expected cost in Phase III was 27.1 million dollars or 44.7% of the total clinical cost (10) . There are two basic methods for a company to receive approval from the MHLW: i) registering as an original drug developer instead, use the actual number of NMEs approved by the MHLW. The R&D expenditure of a particular year was averaged over three years to consider accounting time delay of R&D expenditure. The time lag between the R&D expenditure and its outcome was assumed to be eight years (24, 25) . The "Annual Statistical Survey on Trends in Pharmaceutical Production" published by the MHLW was employed to determine the number of drugs. An interview form provided by the company that seeks approval from the MHLW was employed to identify the originator of the drugs for each NME and ii) registering as a co-development partner. Because there was little information on the clinical stage of the licensed NMEs, we set the weight for a licensed-in NME as 50% and a co-development NME as 20% of the R&D expenditure prior to the NME's approval.
Defi nition of the Malmquist Index and its components
The Malmquist Index was employed to identify the historical change in R&D productivity since a historical trend of DEA scores of R&D productivity does not reveal the causes of changes (23) . The Malmquist Index score (MI score) was 1.00 if there was no change in R&D productivity, less than 1.00 if there was any improvement in R&D productivity, and greater than 1.00 if there was any deterioration in R&D productivity. The MI score can be decomposed into two mutually exclusive scores: the efficiency change (EC) and frontier shift (FS) scores. The EC score measures changes in how companies catch up to the industry benchmark from one period to another. The FS score measures changes in the effi cient frontier, which is an industry-based R&D productivity benchmark in a given year. If R&D productivity deteriorates, both scores are greater than 1.00. The Bartlett test of homogeneity of variances, ANOVA, and Tukey-Kramer test were conducted to identify causes of the deterioration of R&D productivity.
Data exclusion criteria
We selected 24 companies originally but obtained a final sample of 15 companies after applying the following exclusion criteria: i) availability of fi nancial data and ii) signifi cant change in management control. We selected 1980 as the start of the study period because this was when the MHLW started the current approval system and 1997 as the end of the period because this marked the end of the M&A period in Japan; data on R&D expenditure, sales, and operating profit after 1997 may be distorted due to post-M&A processes such as restructuring and R&D reviews. Table 5 shows that the R&D productivity of the 15 Japanese companies declined from 1980 to 1997 and that R&D expenditures that were 2.10 times greater were required in 1997 to generate the same level of output in 1980 (MI score = 2.10). This finding is similar to those of Hashimoto and Haneda (3). This deterioration was mainly due to the decline of the industry benchmark (FS score = 2.08) and the efforts of companies to catch up (EC score = 1.01).
Results and Discussion
Deterioration of the R&D productivity of the Japanese companies from 1980 to 1997
A relationship between the R&D productivity and antibiotics R&D strategy in 1980s
The results of the ANOVA tests show that the changes in R&D productivity differed among companies that developed antibiotics in the 1980s (p < 0.05) and among companies that developed different antibiotics subclasses, that is, '613 and '624' (p < 0.05). However, continuing antibiotics research did not explain the dispersion of R&D productivity among the 15 Japanese companies (Table 6 ). Table 7 shows that antibiotics approvals in the 1980s explained the dispersion of R&D productivity deterioration, but companies' approaches toward antibiotics (i.e., internally or using licensing activities) did not explain the dispersion. Table 8 shows similar results but does not show that a shift from one subclass to another was a factor. The results of our analysis suggest that the deterioration of R&D productivity was a major issue in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry and that involvement in antibiotics R&D helped sustain the R&D productivity of Japanese pharmaceutical companies in the 1980s. Figure 1 shows that the R&D productivity of companies utilizing licensing activities deteriorated, although the deterioration from 1980 to 1997 was not statistically signifi cant. 
Interpretations of the R&D deterioration among
Japanese companies using the Malmquist Index Table 9 shows the decomposition of the Malmquist Index into two components. It illustrates that while the R&D productivity of companies with no approved antibiotics deteriorated significantly, through licensing activities, they were able to catch up with the industry benchmark with an 18% improvement (EC score = 0.82), and internal efforts to develop antibiotics were slightly helped (EC score = 0.98). These results suggest that licensing activities were more useful than internal development for Japanese companies in sustaining R&D productivity in the 1980s. Furthermore, Table 10 shows that the development of a new subclass of antibiotics also helped sustain R&D productivity (EC score = 0.91) even though the TukeyKramer test did not show this factor was statistically significant. The development of subclass '613', the dominant subclass in the 1980s, had a marginal impact on the ability to sustain R&D productivity (EC score = 0.97).
Pharmaceutical company Chugai, which had the worst MI score, merged with Roche in 2000. Similarly, Tokyo Tanabe, which had the third-worst MI score, merged with Mitsubishi Chemical in 1999 (Table 5) . This fi nding is consistent with those of LaMattina (17), which suggest that without an appropriate R&D strategy or improvement of R&D productivity, the industry will continue to pursue M&As in the near future. However, an M&A is not always an appropriate solution since the best fi t may not be available at the time of decision making. Fujisawa, which had the fourth-worst MI score, withdrew its generic drug business from the United States in 1998. This study showed that the R&D productivity deterioration in the industry may explain why companies with the worst productivity scores entered into M&As within a few years of the deterioration. We conclude that the deterioration of R&D productivity was a possible cause of industry consolidation in the 1990s in Japan, albeit further study may be required to verify the causal relationship between these two phenomena.
Implications for the current pharmaceutical industry
Two lessons can be learned from Japan's case. First, to sustain R&D productivity over the long term, companies should use licensing activities and focus on the dominant therapeutic franchises, even on only the most advanced subclass. Second, if a company fails signifi cantly to catch up with the benchmark, it is likely to pursue an M&A or seek an alternative way to improve R&D productivity.
Though the study focused on the Japanese pharmaceutical industry from 1980 to 1997, it made a few interesting observations that can be applied to today's global pharmaceutical industry. The global industry seems to have entered a similar situation, but this assumption needs to be verifi ed quantitatively. In the 1990s, research focus shifted from antibiotics to lifestyle disease drugs. Due to the issue of data availability, we excluded NMEs undergoing clinical trials, even though such NMEs are an important component of R&D productivity. Thus, this study shows only the R&D productivity of companies positioning themselves within the industry. However, if internal data for ongoing R&D programs for each therapeutic franchise can be obtained, it is possible to monitor changes in R&D productivity within a company such as by using the net present value of each NME in the R&D expenditure by therapeutic class. In this way, management can not only monitor changes in R&D productivity relative to the industry benchmark but also analyze how each R&D program affects the company's overall R&D productivity regularly. This study also helps health care professionals and scientists monitor the progress of each R&D program using the same parameters and understand the reasons for any dispersion from the benchmark. The outcomes may help management allocate resources effi ciently.
Sustaining R&D productivity has become a top priority of pharmaceutical companies. The methodology developed in this paper would enable management to monitor changes in R&D productivity relative to the benchmark, understand causes of any dispersion, and consider appropriate measures to resolve issues.
This study illustrated the importance of focusing on dominant therapeutics and the usefulness of licensing activities, and identifi ed a possible cause of deterioration of R&D productivity in the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. The study also found that the deterioration of R&D productivity is a possible cause of M&As, albeit there may be other causes. Tools for monitoring R&D productivity within a company and the industry have become more important as the R&D productivity of global pharmaceuticals continues to decline. Our methodology will enable management to monitor changes in R&D productivity quantitatively and identify an appropriate R&D strategy.
Limitations
Despite using the DEA and Malmquist Index approaches, this study has at least two limitations. First, DEA does not measure absolute efficiency and is sensitive to data selection. Second, we selected the Japanese industry due to data availability. To obtain generalizable results on the relationship between the deterioration of R&D productivity and M&As, future studies should use a more recent global industry data set.
